«Μία στάση πληρωμών εντός ευρώ θα συνεπάγεται τη χρεοκοπία των ελληνικών τραπεζών»
Να αποκηρύξει τις προεκλογικές του δεσμεύσεις, ακόμη και με
το τίμημα της προκήρυξης νέων εκλογών καλεί τον Αλέξη Τσίπρα ο Hugo
Dixon, επικεφαλής συντάκτης του Reuters.
Ειδικότερα, σε άρθρο του στους New York Times, ο αναλυτής εκτιμά πως «δεδομένου πως η Ελλάδα δεν έχει ένα αξιόπιστο Plan B, ο Αλέξης Τσίπρας πρέπει να πείσει τους πιστωτές και να προωθήσει τις απαιτούμενες μεταρρυθμίσεις».
«Αυτό φυσικά, μπορεί να σημάνει την αποκήρυξη των αριστερών δεσμεύσεων και την προκήρυξη νέων εκλογών ή κάποιου δημοψηφίσματος, ώστε να υπάρξει η λαϊκή επικύρωση της αναστροφής του ΣΥΡΙΖΑ» εξηγεί χαρακτηριστικά.
Όμως, συμπληρώνει, το καθήκον του Τσίπρα είναι να υπηρετεί όλους τους Έλληνες, καλώντας τον Έλληνα πρωθυπουργό να συγκρουστεί με την αριστερή εσωτερική «αντιπολίτευση» του ΣΥΡΙΖΑ.
Άλλωστε, σύμφωνα με τον Hugo Dixon, η Ελλάδα δεν διαθέτει και πολλές επιλογές. Εφόσον διασφαλίσει τη μακροπρόθεσμη συμφωνία, τότε θα αναγκαστεί να ...εγκαταλείψει μεγάλο μέρος του προεκλογικού του προγράμματος.
«Κάποια μέλη του ΣΥΡΙΖΑ θα αντιδράσουν, καθώς θεωρούν πως η Ελλάδα θα ανακτήσει την ανεξαρτησία της μέσω της χρεοκοπίας και της εξόδου από την ευρωζώνη» αναφέρει ο αρθρογράφος, καλώντας τον Αλέξη Τσίπρα να αντισταθεί σ’ αυτές τις σειρήνες.
«Ένα τέτοιο ενδεχόμενο θα είναι καταστροφικό. Θα πρόκειται για εφιάλτη. Η ανθρωπιστική κρίση θα επιδεινωθεί και η οικονομία θα διολισθήσει εκ νέου στην ύφεση» περιγράφει ο Hugo Nixon.
Υπάρχει βέβαια, υποστηρίζει, και το εναλλακτικό σχέδιο της χρεοκοπίας εντός ευρώ, το οποίο όμως θα επιφέρει τις ίδιες καταστροφικές συνέπειες.
«Μία στάση πληρωμών εντός ευρώ θα συνεπάγεται τη χρεοκοπία των ελληνικών τραπεζών» προειδοποιεί, καθιστώντας πιθανό ακόμη και το σενάριο του bail in.
www.bankingnews.gr
Ειδικότερα, σε άρθρο του στους New York Times, ο αναλυτής εκτιμά πως «δεδομένου πως η Ελλάδα δεν έχει ένα αξιόπιστο Plan B, ο Αλέξης Τσίπρας πρέπει να πείσει τους πιστωτές και να προωθήσει τις απαιτούμενες μεταρρυθμίσεις».
«Αυτό φυσικά, μπορεί να σημάνει την αποκήρυξη των αριστερών δεσμεύσεων και την προκήρυξη νέων εκλογών ή κάποιου δημοψηφίσματος, ώστε να υπάρξει η λαϊκή επικύρωση της αναστροφής του ΣΥΡΙΖΑ» εξηγεί χαρακτηριστικά.
Όμως, συμπληρώνει, το καθήκον του Τσίπρα είναι να υπηρετεί όλους τους Έλληνες, καλώντας τον Έλληνα πρωθυπουργό να συγκρουστεί με την αριστερή εσωτερική «αντιπολίτευση» του ΣΥΡΙΖΑ.
Άλλωστε, σύμφωνα με τον Hugo Dixon, η Ελλάδα δεν διαθέτει και πολλές επιλογές. Εφόσον διασφαλίσει τη μακροπρόθεσμη συμφωνία, τότε θα αναγκαστεί να ...εγκαταλείψει μεγάλο μέρος του προεκλογικού του προγράμματος.
«Κάποια μέλη του ΣΥΡΙΖΑ θα αντιδράσουν, καθώς θεωρούν πως η Ελλάδα θα ανακτήσει την ανεξαρτησία της μέσω της χρεοκοπίας και της εξόδου από την ευρωζώνη» αναφέρει ο αρθρογράφος, καλώντας τον Αλέξη Τσίπρα να αντισταθεί σ’ αυτές τις σειρήνες.
«Ένα τέτοιο ενδεχόμενο θα είναι καταστροφικό. Θα πρόκειται για εφιάλτη. Η ανθρωπιστική κρίση θα επιδεινωθεί και η οικονομία θα διολισθήσει εκ νέου στην ύφεση» περιγράφει ο Hugo Nixon.
Υπάρχει βέβαια, υποστηρίζει, και το εναλλακτικό σχέδιο της χρεοκοπίας εντός ευρώ, το οποίο όμως θα επιφέρει τις ίδιες καταστροφικές συνέπειες.
«Μία στάση πληρωμών εντός ευρώ θα συνεπάγεται τη χρεοκοπία των ελληνικών τραπεζών» προειδοποιεί, καθιστώντας πιθανό ακόμη και το σενάριο του bail in.
www.bankingnews.gr
Tsipras needs rupture with far-left, not Brussels
By Hugo Dixon
Hugo Dixon is Editor-at-Large, Reuters News. The opinions expressed are his own.
Does Alexis Tsipras, the Greek prime minister, have the guts to break with his far-left faction? The country’s fate hangs on the answer to this question.
Greece’s immediate prospects are dicey. It will default in mid-April unless its euro zone creditors lend it some money or it scrapes together cash from other sources. The key short-term issue is whether the reform proposals Athens plans to submit to creditors on March 30 will be adequate to unlock some credit.
The government sent negotiators to Brussels over the weekend to thrash out the package, following another week during which the technical teams on the ground in Athens achieved little. Meanwhile, Yanis Varoufakis, the finance minister, mused publicly about the possibility of a “rupture.” The implication was that Athens would default if it was not able to secure an acceptable deal with its creditors.
Such a rupture could happen as early as April 9 when Greece has to repay a tranche of money it owes the International Monetary Fund. If Athens defaulted then, capital controls would presumably be imposed at the same time, coinciding with the four-day Greek Easter holiday that starts on April 10.
Tsipras might toy with the idea of calling a snap election to gain renewed support from the Greek people for such a tough line. Given that the opposition is in disarray and his own popularity is riding high, he might hope to win such a vote.
But the government’s approval has already fallen from 83 percent in February to a still high 60 percent last week, according to a poll for Alpha TV, a Greek television station. Its popularity would probably plunge further since cash machines would run out of money within days and key commodities such as petrol might have to be rationed after capital controls were imposed.
If Tsipras is rational, he will want to avoid this scenario. The problem is that he will then have to do a deal with his creditors that will also be painful. They are likely to require him not just to make promises but to start implementing them before they release any more cash.
This is where the prime minister will run into a confrontation with his far-left faction, which accounts for around 30 to 40 of his 149 members of parliament. They will accuse him of selling out, and may well vote against the laws needed to implement a deal with his creditors.
Tsipras would probably still be able to pass legislation with the help of some opposition parties. But such an arrangement could not last for long. In that scenario, the most sensible move would be to call a second election.
The prime minister could then kick out his far-left faction and replace its MPs with moderates. In this scenario, there wouldn’t have been a rupture with Greece’s creditors or capital controls, so Tsipras would be well placed to win the election with an enhanced majority.
The snag is that the prime minister would have to summon up the courage to break with his political comrades. It is unclear whether he is tough enough to do this.
Meanwhile, there is a risk that the government will charge off in the wrong direction even if it secures a quick fix with its creditors in the next week or so. It has promised to deliver a 1.5 percent fiscal surplus before interest payments this year, according to Reuters. But this seems impossible without further austerity measures which will crush the economy.
Tsipras may think he will be a hero at home if he secures an agreement for a 1.5 percent surplus. After all, the current agreement calls for a 3 percent surplus.
But since that deal was made, the economy’s prospects have deteriorated. Political uncertainty has shattered confidence and lack of liquidity is asphyxiating business. The European Central Bank has kept Greek banks on a tight leash, while the government itself has grabbed every little bit of cash it can get its hands on to stop it going bust.
Athens is still predicting 1.4 percent growth this year. But it will be lucky to grow at all. Things will only settle down if the government reaches a new long-term deal with its creditors – for which the current discussions are just the preliminary skirmishing – and that isn’t scheduled until June.
In other words, Tsipras is setting himself up for failure by promising a 1.5 percent surplus. He needs to find a way off this hook. But this won’t be easy since the creditors would consider even a 1.5 percent figure a concession and might hold out for a higher number – as the lower the surplus, the more money they will have to cough up.
The prime minister’s best bet is to convince his creditors that he is so serious about structural reforms that they don’t need to twist the austerity screw further. There is a huge amount to be done – on tax evasion, corruption, rule of law, liberalisation, privatisation, removal of special privileges and so forth. Some of these reforms even fit into a left-wing agenda.
The problem is that Tsipras has not convinced his creditors that he is serious about reform or that his team is remotely on top of the detail. He needs a game-changer. This should, indeed, be a rupture – but with his left faction, not his creditors.
Hugo Dixon is Editor-at-Large, Reuters News. The opinions expressed are his own.
Does Alexis Tsipras, the Greek prime minister, have the guts to break with his far-left faction? The country’s fate hangs on the answer to this question.
Greece’s immediate prospects are dicey. It will default in mid-April unless its euro zone creditors lend it some money or it scrapes together cash from other sources. The key short-term issue is whether the reform proposals Athens plans to submit to creditors on March 30 will be adequate to unlock some credit.
The government sent negotiators to Brussels over the weekend to thrash out the package, following another week during which the technical teams on the ground in Athens achieved little. Meanwhile, Yanis Varoufakis, the finance minister, mused publicly about the possibility of a “rupture.” The implication was that Athens would default if it was not able to secure an acceptable deal with its creditors.
Such a rupture could happen as early as April 9 when Greece has to repay a tranche of money it owes the International Monetary Fund. If Athens defaulted then, capital controls would presumably be imposed at the same time, coinciding with the four-day Greek Easter holiday that starts on April 10.
Tsipras might toy with the idea of calling a snap election to gain renewed support from the Greek people for such a tough line. Given that the opposition is in disarray and his own popularity is riding high, he might hope to win such a vote.
But the government’s approval has already fallen from 83 percent in February to a still high 60 percent last week, according to a poll for Alpha TV, a Greek television station. Its popularity would probably plunge further since cash machines would run out of money within days and key commodities such as petrol might have to be rationed after capital controls were imposed.
If Tsipras is rational, he will want to avoid this scenario. The problem is that he will then have to do a deal with his creditors that will also be painful. They are likely to require him not just to make promises but to start implementing them before they release any more cash.
This is where the prime minister will run into a confrontation with his far-left faction, which accounts for around 30 to 40 of his 149 members of parliament. They will accuse him of selling out, and may well vote against the laws needed to implement a deal with his creditors.
Tsipras would probably still be able to pass legislation with the help of some opposition parties. But such an arrangement could not last for long. In that scenario, the most sensible move would be to call a second election.
The prime minister could then kick out his far-left faction and replace its MPs with moderates. In this scenario, there wouldn’t have been a rupture with Greece’s creditors or capital controls, so Tsipras would be well placed to win the election with an enhanced majority.
The snag is that the prime minister would have to summon up the courage to break with his political comrades. It is unclear whether he is tough enough to do this.
Meanwhile, there is a risk that the government will charge off in the wrong direction even if it secures a quick fix with its creditors in the next week or so. It has promised to deliver a 1.5 percent fiscal surplus before interest payments this year, according to Reuters. But this seems impossible without further austerity measures which will crush the economy.
Tsipras may think he will be a hero at home if he secures an agreement for a 1.5 percent surplus. After all, the current agreement calls for a 3 percent surplus.
But since that deal was made, the economy’s prospects have deteriorated. Political uncertainty has shattered confidence and lack of liquidity is asphyxiating business. The European Central Bank has kept Greek banks on a tight leash, while the government itself has grabbed every little bit of cash it can get its hands on to stop it going bust.
Athens is still predicting 1.4 percent growth this year. But it will be lucky to grow at all. Things will only settle down if the government reaches a new long-term deal with its creditors – for which the current discussions are just the preliminary skirmishing – and that isn’t scheduled until June.
In other words, Tsipras is setting himself up for failure by promising a 1.5 percent surplus. He needs to find a way off this hook. But this won’t be easy since the creditors would consider even a 1.5 percent figure a concession and might hold out for a higher number – as the lower the surplus, the more money they will have to cough up.
The prime minister’s best bet is to convince his creditors that he is so serious about structural reforms that they don’t need to twist the austerity screw further. There is a huge amount to be done – on tax evasion, corruption, rule of law, liberalisation, privatisation, removal of special privileges and so forth. Some of these reforms even fit into a left-wing agenda.
The problem is that Tsipras has not convinced his creditors that he is serious about reform or that his team is remotely on top of the detail. He needs a game-changer. This should, indeed, be a rupture – but with his left faction, not his creditors.
---------------------------------
==========================
"O σιωπών δοκεί συναινείν"
Επίσης στις 29-3-2015 έγραψε ο ίδιος:
Greeks Need Their Leader to Be Tough
Does Alexis Tsipras, the prime minister of Greece, have the guts to break with his far-left faction? The country’s fate hangs on the answer.
Greece’s
immediate prospects are dicey. It will default in mid-April unless its
eurozone creditors lend it more money or it scrapes together cash from
other sources.
The
central short-term issue is whether the reform proposals that Athens
plans to submit to creditors on Monday will be enough to unlock some
credit.
The
government sent negotiators to Brussels over the weekend to hash out
the package after another week during which the technical teams on the
ground in Athens achieved little. Meanwhile, Yanis Varoufakis, the
finance minister, mused publicly about the possibility of a “rupture.”
The implication was that Athens would default if it were not able to
secure an acceptable deal with its creditors.
Such
a rupture could happen as early as April 9, when Greece has to repay
money it owes the International Monetary Fund. If Athens defaults then,
capital controls would presumably be imposed at the same time,
coinciding with the four-day Greek Easter holiday, which starts on April
10.
Mr.
Tsipras might toy with the idea of calling a snap election to gain
renewed support from the Greek people for such a tough line. Given that
the opposition is in disarray and his own popularity is riding high, he
might hope to win such a vote.
But
the government’s approval has already fallen from 83 percent in
February to 60 percent last week, according to a poll for Alpha TV. Its
popularity would probably plunge further since cash machines would run
out of money within days and key commodities such as petrol might have
to be rationed after capital controls were imposed.
If
Mr. Tsipras were rational, he would want to avoid this scenario. The
problem is that he would then have to make a deal with his creditors,
which would also be painful. That would most likely require him not just
to make promises but to start implementing them before any more cash
was released.
This
is where the prime minister will run into a confrontation with his
far-left faction, which accounts for 30 to 40 of his Syriza party’s 149
members in Parliament. They will accuse him of selling out and may well
vote against the laws needed to implement a deal with the country’s
creditors.
Mr. Tsipras would probably still be able to pass legislation with the help of some opposition parties.
But such an arrangement could not last for long. In that scenario, the most sensible move would be to call a second election.
The
prime minister could then kick out his far-left faction and replace its
members of Parliament with moderates. Mr. Tsipras could win the
election with an enhanced majority.
The
snag is that the prime minister would have to summon the courage to
break with his political comrades. It is unclear whether he is tough
enough to do this.
Meanwhile,
there is a risk that the government will charge off in the wrong
direction, even if it secures a quick fix with its creditors in the next
week or so. It has promised to deliver a 1.5 percent fiscal surplus
before interest payments this year, according to Reuters. But this seems
impossible without further austerity measures, which would crush the
economy.
Mr.
Tsipras may think he will be a hero at home if he secures an agreement
for a 1.5 percent surplus. After all, the current agreement calls for a 3
percent surplus.
But
since that deal was made, the economy’s prospects have deteriorated.
Political uncertainty has shattered confidence and lack of liquidity is
choking off business. The European Central Bank has kept Greek banks on a
tight leash, while the government itself has grabbed every little bit
of cash it can get its hands on to keep from going bust.
Athens is still predicting 1.4 percent growth this year. But it will be lucky to grow at all.
Things
will settle down only if the government reaches a new long-term deal
with its creditors, for which the current discussions are just the
preliminary skirmishing.
In
other words, Mr. Tsipras is setting himself up for failure by promising
a 1.5 percent surplus. He needs to find a way off this hook.
The
problem is that Mr. Tsipras has not convinced his creditors that he is
serious about reform or that his team is remotely on top of the detail.
He needs a game-changer. This should, indeed, be a rupture — but with
his left faction, not his creditors.
Hugo Dixon is editor at large of Reuters News.
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